(19) World Intellectual Property Organization International Bureau





(43) International Publication Date 21 December 2000 (21.12.2000)

PCT

(US).

(10) International Publication Number WO 00/77974 A1

(51) International Patent Classification7: G06F 1/00

H04L 9/32,

(21) International Application Number: PCT/US00/05204

(22) International Filing Date: 29 February 2000 (29.02.2000)

(25) Filing Language:

English

(26) Publication Language:

English

(30) Priority Data: 09/330,274

11 June 1999 (11.06.1999)

- (71) Applicant: LIBERATE TECHNOLOGIES [US/US]; 2 Circle Star Way, San Carlos, CA 94070-6200 (US).
- (72) Inventors: XIAO, Peter; 36579 Nettles Court, Fremont, CA 94356 (US). QUILICE, Jeffrey; 1050 Crestview Drive, #26, Mountain View, CA 94040-3431 (US). SWART, Garrett; 770 La Para Avenue, Palo Alto, CA

94303 (US). VALENTE, Luis; 2903 Sevyson Court, Palo Alto, CA 94303 (US).

Group, P.O. Box 390013, Mountain View, CA 94039-0013

RO, RU, SD, SE, SG, SI, SK, SL, TJ, TM, TR, TT, TZ, UA,

(81) Designated States (national): AE, AL, AM, AT, AU, AZ, BA, BB, BG, BR, BY, CA, CH, CN, CR, CU, CZ, DE, DK, DM, EE, ES, FI, GB, GD, GE, GH, GM, HR, HU, ID, IL, IN, IS, JP, KE, KG, KP, KR, KZ, LC, LK, LR, LS, LT, LU, LV, MA, MD, MG, MK, MN, MW, MX, NO, NZ, PL, PT,

UG, UZ, VN, YU, ZA, ZW.

(74) Agent: SWERNOFSKY, Steven, A.; Swernofsky Law

(84) Designated States (regional): ARIPO patent (GH, GM, KE, LS, MW, SD, SL, SZ, TZ, UG, ZW), Eurasian patent (AM, AZ, BY, KG, KZ, MD, RU, TJ, TM), European patent (AT, BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, MC, NL, PT, SE), OAPI patent (BF, BJ, CF, CG, CI, CM, GA, GN, GW, ML, MR, NE, SN, TD, TG).

[Continued on next page]

(54) Title: HIERARCHICAL OPEN SECURITY INFORMATION DELEGATION AND ACQUISITION

General Format of X509 Version 3 Certificate

Version
Serial Number
Algorithm Identifier
Issuer
Period of Validity
Subject Name
Subject Public Key
Extensions
Signature

(57) Abstract: The invention provides a method and system for secure data transfer and dynamic definition of trustworthiness of various entities by multiple parties in a hierarchy tree or graph structure. The invention uses digital certificates. Each party in the business hierarchy can control and define various trust information including trustworthiness delegation authority for the entities it deals with. The ability of a party to redefine or add trust information is controlled by the parties with which it has a relationship that are above it in the hierarchy. Trust vectors and delegation vectors are used to store this information. Each party can add trusted third parties to a security object without compromising the integrity of security objects already issued. A sequence of security objects including digital certificates can be modified without compromising the original digital certificates in those security objects.

WO 00/77974 A1

WO 00/77974 A1



Published:

— With international search report.

For two-letter codes and other abbreviations, refer to the "Guidance Notes on Codes and Abbreviations" appearing at the beginning of each regular issue of the PCT Gazette.

HIERARCHICAL OPEN SECURITY INFORMATION DELEGATION AND ACQUISITION

Background of the Invention

5

1. Field of the Invention

This invention relates to computer security.

10 2. Related Art

In a data delivery system, data receivers need to know whether they can trust information they receive from senders. This need is increasing due to the growth of data exchanges and business transactions taking place on the Internet over non-secure communication links.

15

20

25

The growing Public Key Infrastructure ("PKI") provides a way for receivers of data to know whether they can trust information they receive from senders. In the PKI, trusted third parties issue digital certificates ("public key certificates") that attest to the authenticity of the binding of a public key to its owner. These trusted third parties are known as certification authorities "CAs", or sometimes are called "public CAs" if their services are available to the public. These digital certificates are created and used using known encryption and decryption security techniques. Verisign, Inc. is an example of a public CA. Senders obtain a certificate from a CA, and include the certificate with the data they wish to send to the receiver. The certificate includes enough information for the receiver to verify that the sender's self-identification is accurate (verification of identity), and that the data was not compromised between the sender and the receiver (validation of contents).

The PKI has the general drawback that digital certificates accepted by the receiver are limited to those from certification authorities that the receiver already trusts. Thus the general

problem of providing trust information to the receiver is inherent in the PKI. The trust information required by the receiver can include the identities of trusted senders, for what purpose the senders are trusted, and sufficient information to authenticate messages from the trusted senders.

5

10

For instance, Secure Socket Layer ("SSL) is a widely adopted protocol that is used within the PKI for authentication and encryption. To authenticate a message, the client must have enough trust information regarding the digital certificate sent by the SSL server ("server certificate")--at a minimum the client must have an authentic copy of the certificate of the CA who issued the SSL server certificate. However, computers, particularly in the consumer market, have limited resources, including limited nonvolatile storage, to store such information.

A computer administrator must decide which CAs to trust. In the case of
personal computers used in homes or small offices, the user may be unsophisticated, lacking
in knowledge, or unwilling to make and implement his trust decisions. A common solution is
providing a factory-defined set of trust relationships. This makes the security measures
transparently available to the user. However it is impractical for inexpensive personal
computing devices due to the high cost of nonvolatile memory. In addition this solution
provides a static set of trust relationships, and does not provide for updates.

A method for a computing device to acquire trust information after it is manufactured is provided in the following patent and patent applications:

- 25 o Application No. 08/770,238, filed December 20, 1996, in the name of inventors Wei Yen and Steven Weinstein, titled "Internet Multiplexer for Broadcast and Other Information", and issued November 23, 1999 as Patent No. 5,991,799.
- o Provisional Application Serial No. 60/046,748, filed May 16, 1997, in the name of inventors Luis Valente, Venkatachary Srinivasan, Andreas Atkins and Wei Ling Chu, titled "Client Server Architecture."

o Application Serial No. 09/080,571, filed May 18, 1998, in the name of inventors Luis Valente, Venkatachary Srinivasan, Andreas Atkins and Wei Ling Chu, titled "Security Information Acquisition."

5

10

15

30

o Application Serial No. 09/162,650, filed September 29, 1998, in the name of Luis Valente, titled "Security Information Acquisition."

This patent and these applications are referred to herein as the "Incorporated Disclosures," and are hereby incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

The Incorporated Disclosures disclose the general approach of using Security Information Objects ("SIOs"), with a single Trusted Security Information Provider (or at least a single level of TSIPs) defining the trust relationship for all parties. One drawback of the method disclosed is only the TSIP can issue an SIO. Furthermore, the TSIP must administer all parties's trust information, when the TSIP may only be interested in detailed definition of the trust relationship between the TSIP and its closest business partners. Yet, the TSIP may wish to retain some general control over what other partners can do.

In addition, complex interrelated business relationships exist and are evolving on the Internet, and it is desirable to design a system that will also provide accountability and enforcement of complex business relationships and rules. An example business hierarchy is shown in FIG. 1, and is discussed in detail in the Detailed Description below. Referring to FIG. 1, using the method disclosed in the Incorporated Disclosures, OEM1 and OEM2 would be indistinguishable to ISP1 and ISP2. However, it may be desired to distinguish between OEM1 and OEM2, for instance so that if ISP1 is a client of OEM1, it can be prevented from subscribing to services of OEM2. Or, so OEM2 cannot steal customers of OEM1.

Accordingly, it would be advantageous for a security system to provide a way for each business party to dynamically provide trust information to its clients based on its own

business and security requirements, while centralized control is maintained where desired. The system would be transparent to the end-user, and would be easy to implement.

The invention provides a Hierarchical Open Security Information Delegation and Acquisition System which allows secure and dynamic distribution of security information to multiple clients over non-secure channels. It also allows parties to modify the security information, within boundaries that are set by higher-level parties. Such modification can include adding third-party CAs to the list of entities trusted to issue SSL certificates. It provides a technique for each business party to define its own trust relationships with other entities including public CAs, within the parameters that are hierarchically set.

Summary of the Invention

The invention provides a method and system for secure data transfer and dynamic definition of trustworthiness of various entities by multiple parties in a hierarchy tree or graph structure. The invention uses digital certificates. Each party in the business hierarchy can control and define various trust information including trustworthiness and delegation authority for the entities it deals with. The ability of a party to redefine or add trust information is controlled by the parties with which it has a relationship that are above it in the hierarchy. Trust vectors and delegation vectors are used to store this information. Each party can add trusted third parties to a security object without compromising the integrity of security objects already issued.

Brief Description of the Drawings

FIG. 1 shows an example business hierarchy.

5

10

15

- 25 FIG. 2 shows the general format of an X509 version 3 certificate.
 - FIG. 3 shows a schematic of root certificate chaining.
 - FIG. 4 shows a sample Root Security Information Object for an OEM.
 - FIG. 5 shows sample values given to bits in a trust/delegation vector.
 - FIG. 6 shows a schematic of how an HSIO chain of RSIOs is linked.

FIG. 7 shows a process flow diagram for a client to validate a Hierarchical Security Information Object.

Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiment

In the following description, a preferred embodiment of the invention is described with regard to preferred process steps and data structures. Those skilled in the art would recognize after perusal of this application that embodiments of the invention can be implemented using one or more general purpose processors or special purpose processors or other circuits adapted to particular process steps and data structures described herein, and that implementation of the process steps and data structures described herein would not require undue experimentation or further invention.

Alternative embodiments may use other and further forms of authentication and certification, using other forms of cryptography either in addition to or instead of public key cryptography, and are within the scope and spirit of the invention.

Inventions disclosed herein can be used in conjunction with inventions disclosed in the Incorporated Disclosures, referenced previously.

Overview of the Invention

5

10

15

20

25

The invention provides a secure and dynamic way of distributing trust information from a centralized authority to parties in a hierarchy that have a relationship with it. Among other things, it provides client with enough information to identify trusted SSL servers and authenticate messages from them. It allows each party to define its own trust relationship with the other business parties in the hierarchy and with other entities, including public CAs, within boundaries that are set hierarchically.

The invention provides a way for the hierarchical structure of business relationships to be incorporated into a security system. The party that is directly above another party in the hierarchy has control over the security information of the lower party--including what kind of third-party entities can be added by the lower party.

5

10

A root certificate of the top-level entity in the hierarchy, the Software Provider ("SP") in the preferred embodiment, is preferably stored in non-volatile memory of a computing device at the time of manufacture. Because subsequent SP root certificates are chained together as described in the Incorporated Disclosures , the computing device can verify any later SP root certificate by chaining back to the one stored in its non-volatile memory. (Or, it can verify by chaining back to a more recent SP root certificate it has stored locally subsequent to time of manufacture.)

Each of the other parties provides its own root certificate to the party directly above it in the hierarchy. The higher party includes a fingerprint of the lower party's root certificate in a digital object, called the Root Security Information Object (RSIO).

Each party can define detailed trust information, including additional trusted third-party public CAs. Each party generates its own RSIO, which it digitally signs and passes to the next higher party in the tree. RSIOs are the basic source of trust information.

For any party in the hierarchy, a path can be traced back to the top level party. Each party in the path has an RSIO. When the RSIOs are chained together, that object is called a Hierarchical Security Information Object (HSIO). The RSIOs of the parties (chained into an HSIO) are able to authenticate by tracing an unbroken path of authentication all the way back to the top of the tree, i.e. the Software Provider in the preferred embodiment. Because the SP's root certificate is locally available to all other parties, it can verify the SP's RSIO and each subsequent RSIO can also be verified, given the structure of the RSIOs, as described below.

30

25

A "digital certificate" is a non-forgeable, tamper-proof electronic document that binds an entity's identity to its public key, as is known in the art of public key cryptography. Public key cryptography is discussed in the Incorporated Disclosures.

5

10

15

A "root certificate" is a self-signed and self-authenticating digital certificate.

An entity's "fingerprint" or "signature" is unique data that another entity can recognize as genuine but cannot duplicate. It can function as a person's fingerprint or signature functions in everyday life. In the preferred embodiment, an entity's fingerprint is a SHA-1 hash of its X.509 version 3 certificate.

A "client" is any computing device that participates in the system, including a classical enduser of a conventional network. Examples of a client are a conventional personal computer or workstation, personal digital assistant, a set-top box, cellular telephone, or digital pager. In discussions of the preferred embodiment the term "client" refers to a set-top box used by a customer of an ISP which could be, for instance, a cable TV service.

A "party" is one of the entities that is authorized to issue RSIOs.

20

25

Business Scenario in the Preferred Embodiment

For clarity, the invention is described as applied to a business model in the consumer market, as described below, with the hierarchy having three levels. A sample business hierarchy is shown in FIG. 1.

In the preferred embodiment, the party at the top of the hierarchy is the Software Provider (SP). It provides software that runs on servers and clients of a web-based TV system.

The SP has a business contract with one or more Original Equipment Manufacturers ("OEMs"), for the OEM to manufacture and distribute client and server devices that use SP's software. The OEM is the owner of the hardware (servers and clients that run SP's software) used by the lower levels. The OEM is a large national cable TV company that broadcasts shows. The OEM is the middle level of the hierarchy.

The OEM contracts with one or more Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"). The ISP provides service to individual customers. The ISP also provides its customers with OEM client computers running SP software. The ISP is a small local cable company. The hierarchy can assume many shapes. For example, an ISP may contract with several OEMs, or an OEM may contract with several ISPs.

The invention can be practiced with many other business models. The top-level entity need not be a software provider and need not be affiliated with web-based TV. It can be any entity requiring computer security, including a financial institution, an insurance company, a retail store, a government agency, etc. Likewise, the lower-level entities, if any, can be any entities having a business relationship with the other entities. Currently in the cable television business, it is common for an OEM to also function as the ISP. The business model can have fewer or more than three levels.

20

25

15

5

10

Root Certificates

Each party in the hierarchy provides a root certificate. The root certificate is preferably in X509 version 3 format. A schematic depiction of this format is shown in FIG. 2. Preferably a period of time for which the certificate is valid is stored in the root certificate in the field that is labeled Period of Validity in FIG. 2. (A party's root certificate is provided to the party immediately above it in the hierarchy. This higher party incorporates the root certificate into the as described below.)

There are three types of root certificates in the preferred embodiment: SP root certificate, OEM root certificate, and ISP root certificate.

Chaining of SP Root Certificate

5

10

30

Being the top authority, the SP root certificates are chained together as described in the Incorporated Disclosures. Using this locally stored root certificate, subsequent chained SP root certificates can be verified and validated, as described in the Incorporated Disclosures. Briefly, root certificate chaining is accomplished by placing, in the current certificate, a digest--obtained by means of a one-way secure hash function--of the public key of the next key pair, i.e. the key pair which will replace the current key pair when the current certificate expires. FIG. 3 illustrates root certificate chaining.

Revocation of the root certificate is accomplished as described in the Incorporated Disclosures.

15 At the time of manufacture, the most recent and valid root certificate for the SP is stored in nonvolatile memory of the computing device. When an updated SP root certificate is received, the computing device stores this most recent root certificate. (Thus, a later SP root certificate need only be verified to the most recent root certificate that the computing device has previously stored, which saves time.) However, if the client system reverts to its initial operating state (for instance because of a system malfunction resulting in the loss of all data in writable storage), the client will always be capable of verifying a later root certificate using the root certificate that is stored in the computing device's nonvolatile memory at the time of manufacture.

25 OEM and ISP Root Certificates: self-signed and self-authenticating

The root certificates of lower level entities (OEM and ISP root certificates in the preferred embodiment) are just like any public CA certificates: they are self-signed and self-authenticating as known in the art of cryptography. They are not chained together. To renew or revoke such a root certificate, the certificate is reissued with new key pairs. Note the

higher level party should also remove such a compromised root certificate by removing the root certificate from its RSIO.

5 Root Security Information Object and Hierarchical Security Information Object

Each party (SP, OEM, ISP) generates its own root security information object (RSIO). A sample RSIO for an OEM is shown in FIG. 4. The RSIO is digitally signed by the entity (preferably, by the entity's current root key pair), and preferably contains a timestamp.

10

The OEM's RSIO and the ISP's RSIO each contains its current active root certificate. The SP's RSIO preferably contains the SP's entire root certificate chain. That is, referring to FIG. 4 (which shows a sample OEM RSIO), for an SP RSIO instead of merely having the root certificate for the SP, the entire chain of root certificates for the SP is included.

15

A party's RSIO preferably contains an entry for each entity directly below the party in the hierarchy and can also include a list of the third party CAs that the party trusts. Each trusted entity (preferably either an OEM, ISP, or third party CA) has an entry in the RSIO. Each entity is identified by its fingerprint (to save space).

20

The trust information for the each trusted entity is given in the RSIO, and is preferably implemented by a vector of bits. The delegation information for each trusted entity is given, and is preferably implemented by a vector of bits.

25 Trust Vector and Delegation Vector

Each entity has associated with it a trust vector. Each bit in the trust vector designates a role the entity may play. Preferably, some bits in the trust vector indicate things the entity may do. A sample trust/delegation vector is shown in FIG. 5. For example, bit 0 may indicate that the

entity is a CA trusted to issue certificates for SSL clients, and bit 1 may indicate that the entity is a CA trusted to issue certificates for SSL servers. There may be different grades of SSL servers governed by different bits.

- The trust bits can also indicate what role a Public CA can play. For example, some Public CAs may only be trusted to issue certificates for low-security applications such as personal email, whereas other Public CAs may be trusted to issue certificates for high-security application such as securities trading or electronic funds transfer.
- Other bits in the trust vector identify the entity as belonging to a certain class, which is trusted to do certain acts. For instance, bit 2 may indicate that the entity is an OEM (and thus trusted to issue OEM RSIOs) and bit 3 may indicate that the entity is an ISP (and thus trusted to issue ISP RSIOs. Other bits may indicate the entity is one of SP's special business partners such an SP system software publisher, which is trusted to do certain acts.

15

20

25

30

Preferably, each trusted Entity listed in the RSIO has associated with it a delegation vector. Preferably, each bit in the delegation vector designates whether the corresponding trust vector bit may be turned on by the entity next lowest in the RSIO hierarchy. For instance, the delegation vector in the RSIO for a specific OEM indicates what bits ISPs of that OEM may turn on. This has the effect that an ISP may reduce the trust roles the OEM has assigned an entity (by turning off a trust bit) but may not enlarge the trust roles the OEM has assigned to an entity in the RSIO.

In addition to enabling the OEM to retain control of the changes that an ISP may make, the delegation vector enables the SP to define what authority the OEM or any lower level party has. Thus, the SP can control to some extent what authority all other parties have by being able to prohibit lower entities authority to take certain actions by turning off the delegation vector bit for that action.

Chaining of RSIOs

The RSIO for an entity contains the fingerprints of its children in the hierarchy. The fingerprint is preferably a hash of the root certificate. That is, the OEM's RSIO contains a hash of the ISP's root certificate, and the SP's RSIO contains a hash of the OEM's root certificate.

A chain of RSIO's from the SP's RSIO to OEM's RSIO to ISP's RSIO forms a Hierarchical Security Information Object. Preferably the chain is formed using the fingerprint of the root certificate of the next entity in the chain as the link, as shown schematically in FIG. 6. For instance, the SP RSIO can be linked to OEM1's RSIO by matching OEM1's fingerprint in the SP's RSIO to the OEM1 identification in OEM1's RSIO. An SP can make an RSIO for each OEM or can make a single RSIO for several OEMs, or a combination thereof.

HSIO Validation

15

20

10

5

In the preferred embodiment, the client obtains updated trust information via an HSIO. Before the client relies on the trust information in the HSIO, it must check that the HSIO is genuine and has not been tampered with. An HSIO is a chain of RSIO's from the client back to the SP. In the preferred embodiment, for a client of ISP1, that is an ISP of OEM1, the RSIO chain will consist of SP's RSIO--->OEM1's RSIO--->ISP1's RSIO.

The client can validate the HSIO by the following procedure set out in FIG. 7. First check the validity date of the ISP RSIO against the current date. If it is a valid date, then verify the ISP's RSIO by verifying its signature using the ISP root certificate which is in the ISP RSIO.

Check that the ISP fingerprint (hash of its root certificate) is contained in the OEM's RSIO. Check the validity date of the OEM's RSIO, and verify the OEM signature in the OEM RSIO. Check that the OEM fingerprint (hash of its root certificate) is contained in the SP's RSIO. Validate the SP's RSIO by the procedure described in the above and in the Incorporated Disclosures

If the HSIO passes the checks set out in the previous paragraph, it is a valid and genuine HSIO.

Update of HSIO

5

Preferably, the ISP generates new updated HSIOs, because it is the lowest level in the hierarchy, interacting directly with clients. (However, updating of HSIOs can be done by another party.) To generate a new HSIO for a given chain, the ISP needs the current RSIOs of the SP, OEM, and its own RSIO.

10

Preferably, the client periodically sends the latest timestamp of the three RSIOs in the HSIO (RSIO chain) to the ISP so that the ISP can determine whether a new HSIO should be sent.

Events that trigger generation of a new HSIO are the issuance of a new root certificate by any link in the ISP-OEM-SP chain, and when the trust information in any of the RSIOs has 15 changed.

Example: Verification of a non-partner SSL server

An example use of the invention is set forth here. The SSL protocol is widely used. It may 20 often be desirable for a client to be able to do a transaction with a computer using SSL that is not one of the SP's business partners. For example, a client (cable TV customer) that wants to purchase products over a web-based TV application may need to exchange information with a financial institution SSL server.

25

The client will receive a server certificate, either signed by a CA or else self-signed, from the third-party server. Suppose server certificate is signed by Verisign as a public CA. The client must determine whether this CA is trusted to issue a server certificate.

In the preferred embodiment, the ISP is delegated authority to designate trusted SSL servers and to designate CAs trusted to sign SSL server certificates (In actual application any specific ISP may or may not have such authority depending on how higher level entities have delegated authority. To check whether an ISP has authority to designate CAs trusted to sign SSL certificates, the trust/delegation vector of the OEM RSIO entry for this ISP would be checked.) In the preferred embodiment, the ISP having authority to designate CAs trusted to do so, the client checks the ISP RSIO to see if Verisign is included as a CA trusted to sign SSL server certificates. (Instead of a CA signing the server certificate, the server certificate may be self-signed, e.g. by Citibank. In such a case, the client checks the ISP RSIO to see whether Citibank is a trusted SSL server.)

If the CA signing the server certificate (Verisign in our example) is not authorized to do so in the ISP RSIO, then the client checks the OEM RSIO to see if Verisign is included as a CA trusted to sign SSL server certificates. (Or, if instead of CA such as Verisign signing, the server certificate is self-signed, e.g. by Citibank, the client checks the OEM RSIO to see that Citibank is a trusted SSL server.)

If no authorization is found in the ISP RSIO or the OEM RSIO, then the SP RSIO is similarly checked. If this check fails, then the client cannot do a transaction with this SSL server.

20

5

10

15

If authorization is found in any of the RSIOs in the HSIO, then the standard SSL handshake protocol proceeds.

Example: Step-Up Encryption

25

30

Using strong encryption internationally is strictly regulated by the U.S. government. However, a trust bit can be designated to control whether a party is not trusted to use strong encryption. Preferably, this trust bit would be turned off in the SP RSIO for computing devices where strong encryption is allowed. The respective delegation bit would also be turned off, so that lower level entities could not enable strong encryption.

Alternative Embodiments

Although preferred embodiments are disclosed herein, many variations are possible which remain within the concept, scope, and spirit of the invention, and these variations would become clear to those skilled in the art after perusal of this application.

Claims

1. A method, including steps of

sending a first certificate from a first entity, said first certificate including security information regarding at least a second entity, said first certificate including information authenticating a second certificate from said second entity; and

sending said second certificate from said second entity;

whereby a recipient of said first certificate and said second certificate can authenticate from information therein a first set of security information to associate with said first entity and a second set of security information to associate with said second entity.

- 2. A method as in claim 1, wherein at least one of the following includes a root certificate: said first certificate, said second certificate.
- 3. A method as in claim 1, wherein

said first certificate includes both an expiration date and information authenticating a third certificate; and

said third certificate includes an expiration date other than said expiration date for said first certificate.

20

15

5

- 4. A method as in claim 1, wherein said first certificate includes information authenticating a certificate from said first entity other than said first certificate.
- 5. A method as in claim 1, wherein said first certificate includes information authenticating a future intended version of said first certificate.
 - 6. A method as in claim 1, wherein said second certificate includes information authenticating a third certificate.

7. A method as in claim 1, wherein

said second certificate including security information regarding at least a third entity, said second certificate including information authenticating a third certificate from said third entity;

and including steps of sending said third certificate from said third entity

8. A method as in claim 1, wherein said security information includes a set of authorizations for said second entity.

10

20

5

- 9. An article of manufacture, said article including a computer data signal embodied in readable medium, said readable medium including at least one of the following: a carrier wave, a memory, or a storage device; said data signal including
- a first certificate indicating a first entity as its source and including (a) security information regarding at least a second entity, and (b) information authenticating a second certificate from said second entity.
 - 10. An article as in claim 9, including a second certificate indicating said second entity as its source; whereby a recipient of said first certificate and said second certificate can authenticate from information therein a first set of security information to associate with said first entity and a second set of security information to associate with said second entity.
- 11. An article as in claim 9, wherein at least one of the following includes a root certificate: said first certificate, said second certificate.

12. An article as in claim 9, wherein

said first certificate includes both an expiration date and information authenticating a third certificate; and

said third certificate includes an expiration date other than said expiration date for said first certificate.

- 13. An article as in claim 9, wherein said first certificate includes information authenticating a certificate from said first entity other than said first certificate.
 - 14. An article as in claim 9, wherein said first certificate includes information authenticating a future intended version of said first certificate.
- 10 15. An article as in claim 9, wherein said second certificate includes information authenticating a third certificate.
 - 16. An article as in claim 9, wherein

said second certificate including security information regarding at least a third entity, said second certificate including information authenticating a third certificate from said third entity;

and including steps of sending said third certificate from said third entity

17. An article as in claim 9, wherein said security information includes a set of authorizations for said second entity.

FIGURE 1

Sample Business Hierarchy




FIGURE 2

General Format of X509 Version 3 Certificate

Version
Serial Number
Algorithm Identifier
Issuer
Period of Validity
Subject Name
Subject Public Key
Extensions
Signature

FIGURE 3

Root Certificate Chaining




FIGURE 4

Sample OEM RSIO

(Trusted Entity's	IO, the ISP Root Certificate wo (Trust Information)	(Delegation
Identity)	(Information)
Entity_1 Fingerprint	Entity_1 trust information	Entity_1 delegation information
Entity_2 Fingerprint	Entity_2 trust information	Entity_2 delegation information
•••	•••	•••
Entity_m Fingerprint	Entity_m trust information	Entity_m delegation information
CA_1 Fingerprint	CA_1 trust information	CA_1 delegation informationn
CA_2 Fingerprint	CA_2 trust information	CA_2 delegation informationn
•••	•••	•••
CA_n Fingerprint	CA_n trust information	CA_n delegation informationn
	Timestamp	

FIGURE 5

Sample Trust/Delegation Vector

BIT	DESCRIPTION
0	CA trusted to issue certificates for SSL clients
1	CA trusted to issue certificates for SSL servers
2	CA trusted to issue certificates for SP clients
3	CA trusted to issue certificates for SP servers
4	CA trusted to issue certificates for SP system software publishers
5	CA trusted to issue certificates for SP application software publishers
6	CA trusted to issue certificates for step-up encryption servers
7	Entity trusted as OEM, can issue OEM RSIOs
8	Entity trusted as SP, can issue SP RSIOs
9	SP server instance
10	SP system software publisher
11	Application software publisher

FIGURE 6
Schematic of Hierarchical Security Information Object





FIGURE 7
Validation of an HSIO by ISP Client



INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

Int. onal Application No PCT/US 00/05204

a. classif IPC 7	FICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER H04L9/32 G06F1/00			
	A Constitution (ISO) and both artificial place	vife-ation and IDC		
B. FIELDS	International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national clas	sification and IPC		
	cumentation searched (classification system followed by classif H04L G06F	ication symbols)		
Documentat	ion searched other than minimum documentation to the extent t	hat such documents are included in the fields so	earched	
Electronic da	ata base consulted during the international search (name of dat	a base and, where practical, search terms used	i)	
EPO-In	ternal, WPI Data, INSPEC			
C. DOCUM	ENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT			
Category °	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of th	e relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.	
A	US 5 497 422 A (TYSEN ATTICUS 5 March 1996 (1996-03-05) abstract column 5, line 18 - line 38 column 11, line 9 -column 13, figures 8,9		1-17	
Α	US 5 214 702 A (FISCHER ADDISO 25 May 1993 (1993-05-25) abstract column 4, line 44 - line 68 column 18, line 36 -column 19, figures 4,5		1–17	
X Furt	ther documents are listed in the continuation of box C.	Y Patent family members are listed	in annex.	
 Special categories of cited documents: "A" document defining the general state of the art which is not considered to be of particular relevance "E" earlier document but published on or after the international filing date "L" document which may throw doubts on priority claim(s) or which is cited to establish the publication date of another citation or other special reason (as specified) "O" document referring to an oral disclosure, use, exhibition or other means "P" document published prior to the international filing date but later than the priority date claimed 		"T" later document published after the international filing date or priority date and not in conflict with the application but cited to understand the principle or theory underlying the invention "X" document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is taken alone "Y" document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered to involve an inventive step when the document is combined with one or more other such document is combined with one or more other such documents, such combination being obvious to a person skilled in the art. "&" document member of the same patent family		
	e actual completion of the international search	Date of mailing of the international se	arch report	
	10 July 2000	18/07/2000		
Name and	mailing address of the ISA European Patent Office, P.B. 5818 Patentlaan 2 NL – 2280 HV Rijswijk Tel. (+31-70) 340–2040, Tx. 31 651 epo nl, Fax: (+31-70) 340–3016	Authorized officer Gautier, L		

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

Int. Onal Application No PCT/US 00/05204

C.(Continua	ntion) DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT	
Category °	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
		1,9

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

Int. . onal Application No PCT/US 00/05204

	ent document n search repor	t	Publication date	+	Patent family member(s)	Publication date
US!	5497422	Α	05-03-1996	NONE		
US!	 5214702	 А	25-05-1993	 US	4868877 A	19-09-1989
				US	5005200 A	02-04-1991
				ΑT	122190 T	15-05-1995
				AU	2512488 A	07-09-1989
				CA	1331213 A	02-08-1994
				DE	68 9 22422 D	08-06-1995
				DE	68922422 T	07-09-1995
				EP	0328232 A	16-08-1989
				ES	2071651 T	01-07-1995
				AT	113429 T	15-11-1994
				ΑT	150605 T	15-04-1997
				AU	620291 B	13-02-1992
				AU	4242589 A	13-09-1990
				CA	2000400 A,C	07-09-1990
				DE	69013541 D	01-12-1994
				DE	69013541 T	09-03-1995
				DE	69030268 D	24-04-1997
				DE	69030268 T	26-06-1997
				DK	386867 T	03-04-1995
				EP	0386867 A	12-09-1990
				EP	0586022 A	09-03-1994
				ES	2036978 T	01-01-1995
				ES	2098651 T	01-05-1997
				GR	93300050 T	30-06-1993
				JP	2291043 A	30-11-1990